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Abstract
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We study the impact of a public school choice lottery in Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools on college
enrollment and degree completion. We find a significant overall increase in college attainment
among lottery winners who attend their first choice school. Using rich administrative data on
peers, teachers, course offerings and other inputs, we show that the impacts of choice are strongly
predicted by gains on several measures of school quality. Gains in attainment are concentrated
among girls. Girls respond to attending a better school with higher grades and increases in collegepreparatory course-taking, while boys do not.

Author Manuscript

Today’s urban schools face increasing pressure to matriculate students who are ready for
college. Growing returns to post-secondary education and shrinking middle-wage
employment make college degree completion necessary for upward mobility into the
American middle class (Goldin and Katz 2007; Autor, Katz and Kearney 2008). Improving
the quality of high school education has become a first-order issue for economic growth,
national competitiveness (U.S. Department of Education 2006; Roderick, Nagaoka and Coca
2009), and equality of economic opportunity in light of the increasing wage returns to higher
education (Turner 2004; Dynarski 2008; Heckman and LaFontaine 2010; Acemoglu and
Autor 2010). Yet there is little causal evidence on which policies can increase college
attainment for students most in need (Murnane 2008).
In this paper we study the impact of winning a lottery to attend a public high school in
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools (CMS) on college enrollment and degree completion. CMS
implemented an open enrollment public school choice program in the Fall of 2002, ending
three decades of busing for racial integration and offering high school choice to students
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from all socio-economic backgrounds. Students were guaranteed admission to their
neighborhood school but were allowed to choose and rank up to three schools in the district,
and slots to over-subscribed schools were assigned by lottery number. Students coming from
low-performing high schools actively participated in the choice plan, often choosing
substantially higher-performing high schools over their neighborhood school option.

Author Manuscript

We use student-level administrative data from CMS linked to the National Student
Clearinghouse (NSC), a national database of postsecondary enrollment which records
college enrollment and degree completion for almost all colleges in the U.S.1 We use
assignment by random lottery numbers to chosen schools to identify the causal impact of
attending a chosen school on secondary and post-secondary educational attainment. Our
approach is similar to prior research that uses school lotteries to estimate impacts on
elementary and secondary achievement (Rouse 1998; Howell and Peterson 2002; Hoxby and
Rockoff 2005; Cullen, Jacob and Levitt 2006; Hastings, Kane and Staiger 2008; Wolf et al.
2008; Hoxby and Murarka 2009; Abdulkadiroğlu et al. 2011; Dobbie and Fryer 2011;
Hastings, Neilson and Zimmerman 2012).
Overall we find small but statistically significant increases in high school graduation,
postsecondary attendance and degree completion for students who win the lottery to attend
their first choice school. We also find that the gains from school choice are almost entirely
concentrated among girls. Girls who attend their first choice school are 14 percentage points
more likely to complete a four-year college degree, yet we find no significant impacts for
boys across a variety of measures of postsecondary attainment.

Author Manuscript

We then examine how the impact of choice varies with school characteristics. We construct a
measure of college “value-added”, which measures a school’s likelihood of sending students
to college, conditional on prior characteristics.2 We show that lottery winners with the
largest gains in school quality experience the largest gains in postsecondary attainment. This
is possible because most students who did not get their first choice were assigned to their
neighborhood school. Since the probability of winning the lottery is unrelated to
neighborhood school assignment, and since it is a fixed characteristic at the time of
application (like race or gender), we can compare applicants who choose the same school
but who have neighborhood schools of different quality.

Author Manuscript

Using rich administrative data on school and peer inputs, we show that high-quality schools
differ from low-quality schools along several dimensions. They have students with higher
baseline math scores, a higher fraction of teachers with degrees from selective colleges, and
a higher faction of students completing college-preparatory course requirements. While we
do not have enough statistical power to separate the contribution of each of these variables,
we do show that only girls appear to gain from attending higher quality schools.

1The NSC covers over 90 percent of 4-year college enrollment nationwide and in North Carolina. CMS sent every student who had
ever been enrolled in any grade to the NSC for matching. Rising 9th graders in the Fall of 2002, the first year of new school choice
assignments, could have completed up to five years of post-secondary enrollment, enabling us to measure both matriculation and
degree completion over a reasonable horizon.
2We measure school “value-added” using pre-school choice cohorts only, to address any potential reflection problem with members of
the lottery sample (Manski 1993).
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This suggests that girls are more responsive to gains in school quality – or alternatively, that
a change in environment is more costly for boys. While boys and girls choose similar quality
schools on average and start at their new schools in similar courses with similar class rank,
only girls remain “on track” throughout high school. By the end of high school, female
lottery winners had higher grade point averages, had completed significantly more collegelevel coursework, and were more likely to take the SAT. Male lottery winners, on the other
hand, dropped significantly in class rank, showed no difference in college-level coursework,
and were significantly more likely to fail an end-of-course exam in the upper grades. This
pattern of results mirrors the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) Experiment (Kling, Liebman
and Katz 2007), as well as many recent studies in school settings (e.g. Hastings, Kane and
Staiger 2006, Anderson 2008, Angrist, Lang and Oreopoulos 2009, Angrist and Lavy 2009,
Jackson 2010, Lavy and Schlosser 2011, Lavy, Silva and Weinhardt 2011, Legewie and
DiPrete 2012).

Author Manuscript
Author Manuscript

Taken together, the evidence suggests that girls responded to a more academically
demanding environment with increased effort, while boys did not. This is consistent with
prior work showing gender differences in study habits and time spent on homework (Jacob
2002, Hastings, Kane and Staiger 2006, Frenette and Zeman 2007). Girls might also be more
responsive to increased school quality because of differences in the expected return to a
college education (Charles and Luoh 2003, Goldin, Katz and Kuziemko 2006, DiPrete and
Buchmann 2006). Boys may respond to changes in social environment with maladaptive
behavior, perhaps due to differences in coping behavior, peer norms, or differential response
to relative rank within social group (e.g. Roderick 2003, Clampet-Lundquist et al. 2006,
Niederle and Vesterlund 2007, Barankay, 2011). The bottom line is that the impacts we
observe are the net effect of behavioral responses and adjustments by the students
themselves, as well as their peers, teachers and parents (Pop-Eleches and Urquiola 2011).
To our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the impact of school choice on
postsecondary attainment using a lottery-based research design.3 A series of recent papers
use rule-based secondary school assignment to identify the impacts of school and/or peer
quality for students at the margin of admission (Clark 2010, Jackson 2010, Pop-Eleches and
Urquiola 2011, Abdulkadiroğlu et al. 2011, Dobbie and Fryer 2011). Like the research
design here, these papers share the limitation that they cannot unpack the impact of changing
school assignment into changes in peer quality, teacher quality, or other important inputs.
However, unlike the studies cited above, our research design enables us to observe impacts
across the full range of prior academic preparation and relative rank. Attending a higherquality school may have heterogeneous impacts in a high school setting, where course
tracking and peer group identity are important features of the schooling experience.

Author Manuscript

We also build on an important literature in economics that studies the determinants and
impacts of school quality (e.g. Hanushek 1986, Card and Krueger 1992, Betts 1995,

3Cullen, Jacob and Levitt (2006) and Deming (2011) examine misbehavior and crime using high school lotteries. Booker et al. (2011)
and Lavy (2010) use difference-in-difference, instrumental variable and regression discontinuity approaches to estimate the impact of
public school choice on high school graduation. Fryer (2011) uses a differences-in-differences approach to estimate the impact of
adopting charter school practices in low-performing public high schools on a variety of outcomes, including college attendance among
students in 12th grade at the beginning of the year.
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Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin 2005). Ultimately, we cannot rule out the importance of peer
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effects versus other inputs that can be directly manipulated by schools. However, we can
show that school “value-added” measures, which control directly for observed differences in
peer quality, also predict the impacts of school choice. More generally, we show convincing
evidence that school choice only benefits applicants when they gain access to higher quality
schools, however defined. Thus at least in this setting, there is no benefit of choice per se –
rather, school choice is a mechanism through which students can gain access to higher
quality schools. Finally, our finding of gender differences in responsiveness to school quality
is an important potential explanation for the growing female advantage in completed
schooling (Goldin, Katz and Kuziemko 2006, Diprete and Buchmann 2006, Bailey and
Dynarski 2011).

I. Background
Author Manuscript

Charlotte-Mecklenburg is a large and diverse school district encompassing Mecklenburg
County, which includes both the inner city areas of Charlotte, North Carolina as well as its
suburbs. In 1971, the Supreme Court (in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education) ruled that neighborhood segregation resulted in de facto segregated schools, and
for over 30 years CMS schools bused students across the district to achieve racial
desegregation. In 2001 this historic court order was overturned and the busing plan was
terminated.

Author Manuscript

In December of 2001, the CMS School Board voted to move forward with district-wide open
enrollment for the 2002-2003 school year. In the spring of 2002, CMS asked parents to
submit up to three choices for the upcoming school year for each child, listed in order of
preference. CMS conducted an extensive information campaign to encourage parents to
submit choice forms, including a comprehensive booklet with information about each school
(Hastings and Weinstein 2008). Importantly, they told parents that school choice forms were
required to receive a school assignment in the subsequent year. This resulted in over 95
percent of parents submitting a choice application in the spring of 2002.

Author Manuscript

Each child received guaranteed access to their neighborhood school, which was usually (but
not always) the closest to their home address.4 Students were assigned to their neighborhood
school by default, and admission for all other students was subject to grade-specific capacity
limits that were set by the district beforehand but were not known to families at the time of
the lottery (Hastings, Kane and Staiger 2008).5 When demand for slots among nonguaranteed applicants exceeded supply, admission was allocated by lottery. Random lottery
numbers were assigned within the following priority groups – (1) Students that attended the
school in the previous year and their siblings; (2) Free- or reduced-price-lunch-eligible
(FRPL) students applying to schools where less than half of the previous year’s school
population was FRPL; (3) Students applying to a school within their own choice zone. In
addition, siblings of currently enrolled children received guaranteed access. CMS was also

4Parents who listed three non-guaranteed choices were automatically assigned their “home school” as a 4th choice.
5The district communicated to parents that if they did not submit a choice form, it was unclear which school their child would be
assigned to. Thus parents who wanted their child’s home school submitted a choice form with the home school listed as their first
choice.
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divided into four “choice zones” and free transportation was provided by the district, but
only within each zone. Families could also provide their own transportation to any school.6
The district expanded capacity at schools where they anticipated high demand in an attempt
to give everyone their first choice. Still, many high schools were oversubscribed. Applicants
were sorted by priority group according to these rules, and then assigned a random lottery
number. Slots at each school were first filled by students with guaranteed access, and then
remaining slots were allocated within each priority group according to lottery numbers. If all
members of a priority group could be offered admission, slots were allocated to the next
group in the order of lottery numbers. CMS administered the lottery centrally and applied an
algorithm known as a “first choice maximizer” (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez 2003). This
meant that CMS first allocated slots to all those who listed a school as their first choice and
only then moved to second choices. As the name indicates, this maximized the share of
students who received their first choice. However, it also meant that students who lost the
lottery to attend their first choice school almost always found that their second choice had
been filled up in the previous round. While there is the potential for strategic choice with this
type of lottery mechanism, Hastings, Kane and Staiger (2008) show that this is not likely to
have been a large problem in CMS, at least in the first year of the choice plan.

II. Data Description

Author Manuscript

We match the lottery applicant files to a panel of administrative data from CMS. The lottery
applicant files contain individual choices, lottery numbers, priority groupings and
admissions outcomes. We supplement this with administrative data on all students from
1996 to 2009. These data contain detailed information on student demographics, enrollment
histories, test scores, and course-taking. We use data from the school years prior to the
lottery to construct a set of pre-treatment variables that can be used to test the validity of the
randomization and to examine treatment effect heterogeneity. These pre-treatment covariates
include demographic information such as gender, race, eligibility for free or reduced price
lunch (an indicator of poverty), and students’ scores on standardized End-of-Grade (EOG)
exams in math and reading up to grade 8. We also use prior address information to calculate
median household income in a student’s neighborhood, and we assign them to “home”
schools using high school neighborhood catchment areas.

Author Manuscript

The student records from CMS include linked individual-level information on college
attendance from the National Student Clearinghouse (NSC). The NSC is a non-profit
organization that maintains data on enrollment and graduation for students at over 90 percent
of colleges nationwide. In collaboration with CMS, we constructed a comprehensive list of
students who had ever been enrolled in CMS and were old enough to have matriculated to
college, regardless of the last grade they attended in CMS. CMS then provided this list to
NSC for use in matching to postsecondary records. Due to limited coverage of college
experiences in the NSC, our main outcome variables are enrollment and degree receipt by

6The choice zones were constructed so that there was at least one predominately white suburban and at least one predominantly black
inner-city school in each zone. In addition, free transportation was provided to several “all-zone” magnets from any zone in the
district.
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college type – both two year and four year, as well as measures of college selectivity that are
based on the 2009 Barron’s Profile of American Colleges.7
Although not all colleges provide information to the NSC, the coverage is very good in
North Carolina and the surrounding states. The online Appendix contains a list of colleges
by coverage and a detailed analysis of the match process using data from the Department of
Education’s Integrated Postsecondary Data Source (IPEDS) as a reference. 8 Critically,
students who leave CMS are followed in the NSC data. While we cannot observe test scores
or course-taking for these students, we can measure their college attendance as long as they
were ever enrolled in CMS. Thus, for postsecondary outcomes only, bias from non-random
attrition is not a concern. Attrition is subject only to the NSC’s coverage and the quality of
the match. Unless coverage is differential for lottery winners and losers, the results may be
attenuated but not otherwise biased.

Author Manuscript

We also use CMS administrative data to examine impacts on high school graduation and a
variety of school outcomes such as grades, exam scores and college-level course-taking. We
use these data to measure students’ performance in and progress through courses that leave
them “on track” to graduate with a college-preparatory diploma according to North Carolina
standards, as well as participation in special programs such as AVID and ROTC.9 We further
add information on yearly measures of school resources such as class size, books and
computers from the North Carolina Department of Public Instruction (NCDPI). Finally, we
use CMS personnel files to construct school- and class-level measures of teacher and
guidance counselor characteristics such as years of experience, college quality, and licensing
and certification.

Author Manuscript

III. Sample Characteristics and School Attributes
CMS received high school lottery applications from 29,584 high school students. We first
limit the sample to students who were enrolled in any CMS school in the previous year.
About six percent of applicants come from outside the district, and these students are much
less likely to be enrolled in CMS the following fall. Since previous enrollment status is fixed
at the time of the lottery, this sample restriction does not affect the validity of the
randomization. We also exclude from the sample the small number of students who apply to
special education programs. Finally, we exclude rising 12th graders from the analysis sample
because of concerns about correct randomization.10 This leaves an analysis sample of
20,021 students.

Author Manuscript

7While all colleges in the NSC data report graduation, some do not report degree type. However, this can be inferred by the level of
the school (i.e. four year or two year college). Information on major and degree is available for graduates of about 65 percent of the
colleges covered by the NSC in our data (the share is 75 percent when colleges are weighted by the number of total enrollment spells
in our data). The NSC data have no information about grades, and only collect data on choice of major for a subset of graduates.
8The major two-year college in Charlotte, Central Piedmont Community College (CPCC), did not provide information to the NSC
until 2006. To fill in this gap, we obtained enrollment data directly from CPCC for all years. We also used the CPCC data to verify the
NSC’s match process. See the Data Appendix for details.
9The formal math and science requirements for graduation in North Carolina include only Algebra I and Biology, yet a “college prep”
course of study requires the completion of Geometry and Algebra II as well. The UNC system required students to complete an
additional math course that has Algebra II as a prerequisite and 2 credits in the same foreign language. For more information see:
http://www.dpi.state.nc.us/docs/curriculum/home/graduationrequirements.pdf.
10We have analyzed the individual choice lotteries to confirm that random numbers determine offers of admission, and have found
that they hold perfectly except for in the 12th grade. In reviewing the historical documentation and in conversation with CMS, we have
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About 51 percent (10,302) of students in the sample listed their neighborhood school as their
first choice. Since admission to neighborhood schools was guaranteed, there is no random
variation in school attendance for this group. Of the remaining 9,719 students, nearly half
(4,736) applied to schools that were not oversubscribed, and thus were automatically
admitted. Another one-third of students (3,118) were in priority groups where no one was
admitted, leaving 1,865 students who applied to schools where admission was determined by
random lottery. We use this sample for our analysis. Note that about six percent of this
remaining sample does not show up in any CMS school in the fall of 2002. Although these
students can still be matched to the NSC data and are included in the results for college
attendance and degree completion, we have no other outcome information for them.

Author Manuscript

Table 1 presents summary statistics for the overall analysis sample and the lottery
subsample. Compared to the rest of the sample, lottery applicants are disproportionately
low-income, African American, and had lower test scores and higher absences and out-ofschool suspensions in 8th grade. Overall about 46 percent of students in the lottery sample
are admitted to their first choice, compared to 83 percent of other students. Approximately
63 percent of the lottery sample is comprised of rising 9th graders, while 25 percent are
rising 10th graders and the remaining 12 percent are rising 11th graders.11
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the 14 neighborhood and 3 magnet high schools in
CMS. Schools vary widely in income, demographic composition, average student test scores
and postsecondary attainment. Median household income ranges from $89,089 (in 2000
dollars) in Providence to $32,744 in West Charlotte.12 Similarly, the share of minority
(black or Hispanic) students ranges from 11 to 94 percent. Average 8th grade math scores
have a range of around 1.3 student-level standard deviations.

Author Manuscript

Magnet high schools serve predominately nonwhite students in the lower end of the income
distribution. This is due in part to their location in the central city, whereas many of the
higher-income schools are located in the surrounding suburbs. Magnet schools rank near the
district average on measures such as average test scores, high school graduation and college
attendance. Overall, applicants to magnet schools constitute 35 percent of the lottery sample.
13 Column 4 shows the percent of students in each neighborhood school zone that are in the
lottery sample. While students in the lottery sample are drawn disproportionately from inner
city schools with high shares of minority students, there are many different neighborhood
school by choice school combinations. Online Appendix Table 1 shows a matrix of counts of
neighborhood school by choice school combinations, separated by rising grade cohorts.

Author Manuscript

some concern that additional slots may have been made available at schools for rising 12th grade applicants. Thus we exclude from the
analysis the 85 rising 12th grade applicants who were in marginal priority groups (about 4 percent of the lottery sample).
11About 50 percent of rising 9th grade students in the lottery sample are admitted, compared to 37 percent for 10th and 11th graders.
Less than 2 percent of rising 9th grade students have missing test score information, compared to about 10 percent for 10th and 11th
graders combined. This is due to the fact that 8th graders would have taken End of Grade exams in CMS, whereas 9th and 10th
graders do not have to take a uniform exam. Other than differences in missing scores and in admission rates, sample characteristics are
very similar for students across grade cohorts.
12We assign each student the median household income in their 2000 census tract and calculate the school measures as the average of
each student’s median tract household income.
13Note that the magnet schools do not admit all students by lottery – depending on rising grade and priority group, some students are
automatically admitted.
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Column 5 of Table 2 shows the share of first-time rising 9th grade students in each school
who eventually enroll in a four-year college. Column 6 presents estimates of college “value
added”, constructed as the school average residual from a linear regression of four-year
college attendance on a set of basic covariates from our main specifications, including a
polynomial in prior math and reading scores.14 To minimize the mechanical influence of
students in the lottery sample, we estimate college “value added” using first-time 9th grade
students from Fall 1998 and 1999.15 The base rates of four-year college attendance also
come from these two older grade cohorts.

Author Manuscript

College attendance rates range from 67 percent in Providence to 24 percent in West
Mecklenburg, while college “value-added” ranges from 0.047 to −0.093. If the college
“value-added” estimates were unbiased after controlling for prior characteristics, they could
be interpreted as each school’s contribution to the chances that a randomly chosen student in
the 9th grade cohort will attend a four-year college. In that case, switching from West
Mecklenburg to Providence would make a student 0.047-(−0.093) = 14 percentage points
more likely to attend a four-year college. We present the results in Column 6 not as true
unbiased measures of school quality, but to show that demographics are not a perfect
predictor of college attendance rates. For example, while West Charlotte has lower average
income and lower 8th grade math scores than West Mecklenburg, freshmen in West Charlotte
are nonetheless about 8 percentage points more likely to attend a four-year college (0.32 vs.
0.24, Column 5). This leads to the large disparity in college “value added” among the two
schools. Later we will examine heterogeneity in the impact of choice by this and other
measures of school quality.

IV. Empirical Strategy
Author Manuscript

We begin by following the standard approach in lottery-based studies of school choice,
which estimate the average impact of winning the lottery across multiple schools and grades
(Rouse 1998; Hoxby and Rockoff 2004; Cullen, Jacob and Levitt 2006; Hastings, Kane and
Staiger 2008; Hoxby and Murarka 2009; Abdulkadiroğlu et al. 2011; Deming 2011;
Hastings, Neilson and Zimmerman 2012). We estimate:
(1)

Author Manuscript

whereWij is an indicator variable that is equal to one if student i has a winning lottery
number for admission to school j, Aij are academic outcomes of interest, Xij is a vector of
pre-lottery covariates that is included only for improved precision,Γ j is a set of lottery fixed
effects, and εij is a stochastic error term.16 We use only first choices in the model, so the
number of observations in the regression is simply equal to the number of students in the

14We estimate A = β X + v , where v = μ + ε . A is an indicator variable for whether a student ever attended a four-year
ij
ij ij
ij j ij ij
college. The Xij vector includes indicators for race, gender, free or reduced price lunch and third order polynomials in stateth
standardized 8 grade math and reading end-of-grade (EOG) exams. We pool the 9th grade cohorts of 1998 and 1999, and capture the
school-level residual μj as our estimate of school “value-added”.
15Since the lottery sample is comprised of students from the 2000-2002 9th grade cohorts, there is no direct overlap in classrooms
between lottery applicants and the students used to construct the “value-added” measure. The results are robust to using only one of
the two years, and to using later grade cohorts with lottery applicants excluded from the calculation.

Am Econ Rev. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2016 February 29.

Deming et al.

Page 9

Author Manuscript

sample. In principle we could estimate a nested model that incorporates multiple choices and
accounts for students’ “risk sets” (Abdulkadiroğlu et al. 2011). However, since students who
lost the lottery to attend their first choice school were generally shut out of other
oversubscribed schools, there is almost no randomization on 2nd and 3rd choices.
The β parameter from equation (1) gives the intent-to-treat (ITT) impact of winning the
lottery on student outcomes. In most specifications, we use the lottery assignment as an
instrumental variable (IV) for enrollment in a student’s first choice school in the Fall of
2002. 17 This results in the following two-stage least squares (2SLS) specification with
enrollment Eij as the endogenous variable in the first stage:
(2)

Author Manuscript

(3)

Since some students who lost the lottery still managed to enroll in their first choice, these
estimates are local average treatment effects (LATEs) for students who comply with their
lottery status (Angrist, Imbens and Rubin 1996). Lottery fixed effects Γj are necessary to
ensure that the ex-ante probability of admission to a first-choice school does not differ
between lottery winners and losers (Rouse 1998). In equation (3), δ gives the weighted
average of outcome differences summed over each individual lottery, with weights equal to
N *[p(1– p)] where N is the number of applicants and p is the probability of admission
(Cullen, Jacob and Levitt 2006).

Author Manuscript

We can test the validity of the randomization by replacing the outcomes Aij in equation (3)
with predetermined covariates such as race, gender and prior test scores. If the
randomization was conducted correctly, winners and losers should be balanced on all
characteristics that are fixed at the time of the lottery. We test this in Online Appendix Table
2 and find no statistically significant differences between lottery winners and losers along
pre-determined covariates.18

Author Manuscript

16The lotteries were actually conducted at the school-grade-priority group level, so the number of lotteries is greater than the number
of schools. We suppress subscripts for grade and priority group for notational convenience. The Xij vector includes controls for
median household income in the 2000 Census block group, race, gender, free or reduced price lunch, a third order polynomial in 8th
grade math and reading test scores plus indicator variables for missing scores, indicators for the level of math taken in 8th grade (since
some students are already enrolled in advanced math), and neighborhood (i.e. sending) school fixed effects.
17An alternative approach, pursued by Abdulkadiroğlu et al (2011), is to instrument for total years of enrollment in one’s first choice
school. This allows the impact of winning the lottery to vary for students of different rising grades, but also implicitly assumes that the
impact is linear in exposure. A linear specification is appropriate for mechanisms that unfold over time, such as exposure to collegebound peers or gradual building of skills. Other mechanisms, such as being placed on the right “track” in courses or getting help from
a guidance counselor, imply that equivalent impacts by rising grade are more appropriate.
18In addition, because we have the lottery numbers, priority groups, and admission outputs from the lottery computer algorithm, we
are able to verify lottery-by-lottery that indeed lottery numbers were randomly assigned and admission complied with the lottery
procedures.
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V. Results
V.A Main Results

Author Manuscript

Table 3 examines the impact of attending a first choice school on post-secondary outcomes
including college enrollment and degree completion. Each row contains an estimate of the
2SLS model in equations (2) and (3), where the lottery is used as an instrument for
enrollment. Standard errors appear below each estimate in brackets. They are clustered at the
individual lottery level. Column 1 shows results for the full sample. Overall, we find small
positive impacts of winning the lottery on four-year college enrollment and degree
completion. However, we find statistically significant increases in enrollment and degree
completion of about four percentage points in colleges that are classified by the 2009
Barron’s Profile of American Colleges as “very competitive” or higher, which we refer to
here as “selective” colleges. 19 These are large proportional impacts, about 40 and 60
percent increases from the control mean baselines of 11 percentage points for attendance and
7 percentage points for degree completion.20

Author Manuscript

The last row of Table 3 presents results from a summary index that combines information
across all attainment outcomes (O’Brien 1984, Kling, Liebman and Katz 2007, Anderson
2008, Deming 2009).21 In addition to the outcomes listed in Table 3, the summary index
also includes enrollment and degree completion in any postsecondary institution (including
2-year colleges) and in “most competitive” colleges, the most selective category according to
the Barron’s rankings.22 To create the index, we first normalize each outcome to have a
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. We then create a single summary index
variable that averages across outcomes and weights by the inverse of the sample covariance
matrix to account for dependence across outcomes (O’Brien 1984). In the last row of
Column 1, we see that lottery winners score 0.078 standard deviations higher on the
Attainment Index, and the impact is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
In Columns 2 and 3 we examine gender heterogeneity in the impact of winning the lottery.
The results are from a single estimate of equations (2) and (3) with a full set of interactions
between winning the lottery and indicator variables for whether a student is male or female.
There are large and statistically significant differences in impacts on four-year college
attendance for girls versus boys. Girls who attend their first choice school are almost 17
percentage points more likely to attend a four-year college and 8 percentage points more
likely to attend a very competitive college. In contrast, boys are actually 9 percentage points
less likely (but not significant) to attend a four-year college and no more likely to attend a
very competitive college. Turning to degree completion, girls are 14 and 9 percentage points

Author Manuscript

19Schools in North Carolina with a rating of “very competitive” or higher include Appalachian State University, Duke University,
Elon University, North Carolina State University, UNC-Asheville, UNC-Chapel Hill, UNC-Wilmington, and Wake Forest University.
Four year public colleges in North Carolina that are less than “very competitive” include East Carolina University, Fayetteville State
University, North Carolina A&T University, North Carolina Central University, UNC-Charlotte, UNC-Greensboro, UNC-Pembroke,
Western Carolina University and Winston-Salem State University, as well as all of the major for-profit colleges.
20Since some enrollment and degree outcomes are relatively rare, we explore the sensitivity of our results to a nonlinear logit
specification in online Appendix Table 4. In general, the results and their statistical significance (overall and for the subgroups in Table
5 when applicable) hold up to nonlinear specifications such as logit and probit (not shown).
21We thank the editor for this suggestion.
22Schools in North Carolina with a rating of “most competitive” or higher include only Davidson, Duke, UNC-Chapel Hill, and Wake
Forest. The additional outcomes are listed in Online Appendix Table 3.
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more likely to complete a degree at a four-year college and a very competitive college
respectively, with no significant impact for boys. 23 Overall, we find an increase in
postsecondary attainment of about 0.19 standard deviations for girls, with zero impact for
boys, and the gender differences is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This
matches the growing body of evidence that girls benefit academically more than boys from
educational interventions (e.g. Hastings, Kane and Staiger 2006, Anderson 2008, Angrist,
Lang and Oreopoulos 2009, Angrist and Lavy 2009, Deming 2009, Jackson 2010, Lavy and
Schlosser 2011, Lavy, Silva and Weinhardt 2011, Legewie and DiPrete 2012).24

Author Manuscript

Finally, we examine heterogeneity by neighborhood (i.e. sending) school. Because every
student who applies to the same school (within a given priority group) has the same ex ante
chance of admission, an applicant’s neighborhood school is a valid covariate on which to
split the sample, similar to race or prior test scores. This setup allows us to compare
treatment effects for students who applied to the same school, but who had outside options
of different quality, generating variation in school quality gains within lottery. We divide
schools into two groups based on their college “value-added”. We advisedly label the four
lowest-ranked schools on the college value-added measure as “low quality” and all other
neighborhood schools as “high quality”. This dichotomization of schools is not sensitive to
changes such as removing a particular school or including another.25 On average, students
who win lotteries and come from low quality neighborhood schools experience a 5.3
percentage point increase in college value-added, compared to a decline of 1.5 percentage
points among applicants with high quality neighborhood schools. This difference in school
quality “dosage” is statistically significant at less than the one percent level.

Author Manuscript

Columns 4 and 5 show results separated by neighborhood school quality. Overall,
neighborhood school quality is a strong predictor of the impact of choice on postsecondary
attainment. We find large and statistically significant increases in high school graduation and
college degree completion among applicants with low quality neighborhood schools, but no
significant impacts in the “high quality” sample. An F-test of the joint hypothesis that the
results on the attainment index are significantly different by neighborhood school quality
yields a p-value of 0.019. In Columns 6 and 7, we show separate results by gender, within
the low quality neighborhood school sample. These estimates come from a single regression
specification with all four gender by school quality combinations. 26 In the low quality
neighborhood school sample, we find positive (but imprecise) gains for boys and large,

Author Manuscript

23Male lottery winners are somewhat more likely to attend and complete a degree at a two year college, although the impact is not
statistically significant. We do find marginally significant increases in “most competitive” college enrollment among boys, although
the total number of attendees is very small. Finally, part of the large increase in four-year (not competitive) college attendance and
degree completion is driven by greater female attendance at for-profit colleges, which have shown mixed results in terms of return on
investment (e.g. Deming, Goldin and Katz 2012). The impacts are somewhat smaller (but still significant) when for-profit colleges are
excluded. All these results are in online Appendix Table 4.
24We also examine heterogeneous impacts by race, poverty, whether students’ 8th grade math score is above or below the median in
the sample, and rising grade cohort (9th vs. 10th or 11th). While there are some differences in outcomes by student group, the
summary index measures of attainment are never significantly different from each other, nor are they as large as the gender differences
shown in Table 3. Those results are reported in online Appendix Table 5.
25In online Appendix Table 6, we present results based on some alternative rules for grouping schools based on quality. In online
Appendix Table 7, we allow the impact of winning the lottery to vary continuously with college “value-added” by using college
“value-added” rather than enrollment as the endogenous variable in the 2SLS system in equations (2) and (3). None of these
alternative procedures changes the substantive nature of our conclusions.
26For space considerations we do not report results by gender for the “high quality” sample, but those results are available in online
Appendix Table 5.
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statistically significant gains in attainment for girls. Notably, the gender difference in
impacts in the low quality neighborhood school sample (0.10 SDs for boys, 0.29 SDs for
girls) is very similar in size to the full sample (-0.01 SDs for boys, 0.19 SDs for girls).27

Author Manuscript

Before proceeding, we address some potential concerns with the interpretation of above
results. First, we have college attendance data from the NSC through the Spring of 2011.
This means that rising 9th grade students who progress normally through high school would
be able to attend a maximum of 10 semesters (Fall 2006 to Spring 2011) of college. Thus for
rising 9th grade students in 2002 our outcome is completion of a degree within 5 years of
high school graduation, with additional years available for 10th and 11th graders. If lottery
applicants are more likely to enroll and progress through college “on time” for their grade
cohort, this limited window of data could upwardly bias our results for degree completion.
This is a particular concern in less selective public institutions, where time-to-degree has
increased over time (Bound, Lovenheim and Turner 2012).
To address this, we examine the subset of students in our sample who appear to be persisting
continuously in college through Spring 2011.28 In online Appendix Table 8, we reconstruct
our main outcomes in Table 3 under the assumption that all lottery losers, but no lottery
winners, who persist continuously eventually obtain a degree. With this very conservative
assumption, we find a decline in four-year degree completion of only about 3.5 percentage
points, and zero impact on degree completion at very competitive colleges. Moreover, results
for the summary index of attainment are still positive and marginally significant. This
suggests that the increase in degree completion among lottery winners is unlikely to shrink
much with additional years of data.

Author Manuscript

A second concern with our interpretation is that neighborhood school quality is simply an
indicator for other differences between students in the two samples. For example, students
from low quality neighborhood schools differ systematically by income and prior test scores,
and those characteristics may drive the gains from choice. However, in online Appendix
Table 9 we show that the greater impacts in the “low quality” neighborhood school sample
hold within splits across a wide variety of covariates, including race, poverty and prior test
scores. Following Angrist et al. (2011), we implement an Oaxaca-Blinder-style
decomposition, which shows that the difference in impacts by neighborhood school quality
cannot be attributed to differences in observed student characteristics.29 While we cannot
fully rule out that lottery applicants differ across neighborhood schools along unobserved
dimensions in ways that are correlated with the impacts of choice, we find no evidence that
differences in observed student characteristics are driving the differences in impacts by
neighborhood school quality.

Author Manuscript

27Boys in the “high quality” neighborhood school sample score about 0.09 standard deviations (SDs) lower on the summary index of
attainment, while girls score about 0.10 SDs higher. Neither estimate is statistically significant.
28We define continuous persistence as continuous enrollment from graduation through Spring 2011 with a gap of no more than one
semester (not including summers). 50 of the 112 students still enrolled in a four-year college in Spring 2011 meet this definition (34 if
we do not allow for any gaps). Of the 112 students who were still enrolled, 43.8 percent of lottery winners were “persisters” compared
with 45.3 percent of lottery losers.
29The results of this decomposition are in online Appendix Table 10, along with a more detailed description of the procedure.
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We next investigate the extent to which school characteristics, including peers, may
contribute to our findings. Table 4 reports the impact of attending one’s first-choice school
on peer and school characteristics, including summary index measures of peer quality and
school resources (including teachers).30 It follows the same structure Table 3. We report
results for two measures of school quality that attempt to control for observed differences in
peers - college “value added” (from Table 2), and a school-level measure of “on track” in 9th
grade that controls for prior differences in academic preparation.31 We note that these
residualized measures of school quality will not account for unobserved differences or
nonlinearities in peer quality, such as a “critical mass” of able peers, which could lead
directly to changes in course offerings, teacher quality and improved resources. For space
reasons we present only a limited selection of school characteristics, with the full set of
results available in online Appendix Table 11.

Author Manuscript

The combined results of Table 4 lead to two important conclusions. First, comparing
columns 2 and 3 and columns 6 and 7, we find no evidence for gender differences in
measures of peer or school quality. Since boys and girls in the lottery sample apply to and
attend similar schools and come from similar neighborhoods, differences in outcomes must
reflect gender differences in responsiveness to school or peer quality. Second, comparing
columns 4 and 5, we find significant differences in both peer and school quality between
applicants coming from low- versus high-quality neighborhood schools. Since our quality
measure is college “value-added” (seen here in the last row of Table 4), this amounts to
observing that college “value-added” is strongly correlated with a variety of measures of
school quality.

Author Manuscript

In the first three rows of Table 4, we see that lottery winners from low-quality neighborhood
schools who attend their first choice school have peers that are significantly stronger
academically (e.g. 0.36 SDs higher 8th grade math scores), but relatively similar in terms of
demographics. Moving to school characteristics, we see that they have significantly smaller
classes in End-of-Course (EOC) subjects and are substantially more likely to have a teacher
with a bachelor’s degree from a selective college. In contrast, lottery winners from highquality neighborhood schools experience no significant increases in observed measures of
peer or school quality, with significant declines in resources in a few cases. Finally, we also
find that lottery winners attend schools with a greater share of students who are “on track” in
their math and science courses toward a college-preparatory diploma. This measure reflects
a combination of 1) differences in the prior academic preparation of peers, and 2) differences

Author Manuscript

30Students in the lottery sample are excluded from the calculation of the peer quality measures to avoid a mechanical correlation with
the outcome. Each index is normalized and weighted as described earlier in the text. The peer index contains measures of peers’ 8th
grade math and reading scores, days suspended from school, days absent, and prior EOC math coursework (some students take
Algebra I in 8th grade). The resource/teacher index includes measures of class size in EOC courses, the ratio of books to students and
students to computers, whether students’ EOC course teachers are first year teachers, the selectivity of the colleges attended by EOC
teachers (very competitive, most competitive), guidance counselors per capita, and the selectivity of colleges attended by guidance
counselors.
31The college “value-added” measure is described in Section III. The “on track” measure is a summary index of the school-level
residuals from regressions of the probability that a student is in Algebra I or higher and Biology or higher in 9th grade, controlling for
a full set of covariates including prior test scores and EOC math placement. For both “on track” measures, we use the rising 9th grade
cohorts of 1998 and 1999, several years prior to the lottery, in order to minimize reflection problems with the lottery sample (Manski
1993).
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in the academic rigor of the school holding peer quality constant. While these mechanisms
cannot be fully separated, we can show that lottery winners from low-quality neighborhood
schools attend schools where students are more likely to stay on track conditional on
baseline test scores. For lottery winners with low quality neighborhood schools, the
magnitude (0.93 SDs on the residual “on track” index, Column 5) is very similar to the
change in peer quality (0.98 SDs).

Author Manuscript

While the impacts on some measures appear larger than others, this is difficult to interpret
without information about the causal impact of each input on postsecondary attainment. For
example, even though the mean impact of choice on resource and teacher quality is not
statistically significant, perhaps there are certain inputs (for example, teacher or guidance
counselor college selectivity) that have a large influence on student outcomes, and thus
should be weighted more heavily. Without a variety of experiments that carefully manipulate
teachers, peers and other school attributes, we cannot separately identify the impact of each
input. Moreover, as Table 4 shows, they are highly collinear.

Author Manuscript

Still, the distinction between peers and inputs that can be affected directly by policy is
particularly important. Jackson (2010) finds that direct peer quality accounts for only 10
percent of school “value-added” overall, but one-third among highly selective schools.
Similarly, recent work that identifies the impacts of attending a better school for students at
the margin of admission using a regression discontinuity (RD) design finds mixed results
(Clark 2010, Jackson 2010, Pop-Eleches and Urquiola 2011, Abdulkadiroğlu et al. 2011,
Dobbie and Fryer 2011). In particular, Dobbie and Fryer (2011) find no impact of admission
to selective exam schools in New York City on postsecondary outcomes, despite large gains
in peer quality. Because these RD studies necessarily compare the highest scoring students
in a lower-ranked school to the lowest scoring students in a higher ranked school, they
identify peer effects (and responses to resources and other school-level differences) at a
particular margin. These impacts will not necessarily generalize to the range of applicants in
a school choice lottery, particularly in high school when identity and peer sorting can
generate unpredictable results (Akerlof and Kranton 2002, Carrell, Sacerdote and West
2011, Cicala, Fryer and Spenkuch 2011).

Author Manuscript

Our main results for attainment are broadly consistent with the gains we find on measures of
peer quality. However, we also find that the impacts for lottery winners are larger when they
gain more resources and teacher quality (although the estimates are noisy), and when they
gain more on school-level measures of college “value added” and keeping students “on
track”. Importantly, these last two measures explicitly control for observed differences in
peers across schools, and may be proxies for important school policies and practices that we
do not observe. Nonetheless, the evidence on mechanisms is ultimately suggestive,
particularly in an environment where students, peers, teachers and parents may respond by
adjusting their behavior or effort in a variety of ways (Pop-Eleches and Urquiola 2011).
One alternative approach, which we pursue in Online Appendix Table 7, is to use various
measures of school quality as first-stage endogenous variables. In principle, we could
determine which measures of quality are most correlated with increased attainment,
controlling for the others. However, while many of the measures are strong predictors
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independently, there is insufficient variation to identify mechanisms when multiple measures
are included.
More importantly, however, any explanation of our results must account for gender
differences in responsiveness to peer or school quality. We examine these in more detail in
Table 5.
V.C Mediating Outcomes in High School

Author Manuscript

Table 5 presents results for a broad range of academic outcomes in high school. For space
reasons we present only a small selection of academic outcomes, with the full set of results
available in Online Appendix Table 12. The last row of Table 5 is a summary index of all
mediating outcomes (constructed identically to the summary indices in Tables 3 and 4),
including those not presented in the table. In reading this table it is important to remember
that we do not observe high school outcomes (as opposed to college outcomes) for students
who leave CMS. 32 However, high school outcomes may uncover important intermediate
changes in student’s achievement and experiences, pointing to potential mechanisms
underlying our main results.

Author Manuscript

Lottery winners who attend their first choice school have higher cumulative grade point
averages, complete more total EOC math courses, and are more likely to stay “on track”
towards completing college preparatory math requirements. 33 We find no increases in
advanced placement (AP) math course-taking, nor do we find evidence of increased
enrollment in advanced math or science classes such as pre-calculus, statistics or physics
(results for these subjects and many others, including extracurricular programs, are included
in online Appendix Table 13). In the last row of Column 1, we find an overall increase of
about 0.06 SDs on a summary index of all mediating outcomes. In Columns 2 and 3, we see
that, like postsecondary attainment, these overall gains are driven entirely by girls. The
pattern of impacts by gender and school quality for the main results in Table 3 also holds
here, with small and imprecise gains for boys but large gains for girls from “low quality”
neighborhood schools.
We find no impact on the SAT scores overall or in any of the subsamples in Table 4. Yet we
do find large and statistically significant increases in SAT exam-taking among girls,

Author Manuscript

32In online Appendix Table 13 we show that lottery winners are 2 percentage points more likely to enroll in CMS in the Fall after
choice, and approximately 5 percentage points more likely to be enrolled in CMS by Spring 2004. We deal with missing data in two
ways. First, we vary our treatment of missing outcome information. For the SAT and EOC exam-taking outcomes, we count students
who do not take the exam because they are no longer in CMS as zeroes. Similarly, we measure cumulative course-taking including all
students in the sample, regardless of when they exit CMS. However, our measures of “on track” course-taking (both by year and by
subject, i.e. “on track in math in 2002-2003 and ”geometry or higher by 10th grade“) are all conditional on students being enrolled in
CMS in the indicated year or grade. Second, we investigate the sensitivity of these results to a wide variety of assumptions about
differential attrition in online Appendix Table 14. In general, imputation of missing scores and course-taking variables leaves the
results substantively unchanged. Bounding exercises for exam and course-taking results generally fail to diminish the statistical
significance of those findings. However, bounding exercises for EOC test score or SAT impacts lead to confidence intervals that are
too wide to draw any firm conclusions.
33High school GPA is a summary measure calculated at the end of each year and provided to us by CMS. We do not have information
on grades separated out by course. Students who leave CMS or drop out during high school are included in this measure, with their
cumulative GPA as of the last semester of enrollment. EOC math courses are Algebra I, Geometry and Algebra II, with statestandardized exams at the end of course. ”On Track“ is defined as taking Algebra I by 9th grade, Geometry by 10th grade and Algebra
II by 11th grade, given that the North Carolina requirements for a college-preparatory diploma are the 3 EOC courses plus one
additional more advanced course (4 total).
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especially girls in the low quality neighborhood school sample. This pattern of imprecise
impacts on scores but increases in taking the exam and “on track” course-taking also holds
across all of the EOC math and science subjects. Lottery winners who attend their first
choice school are more likely to graduate from a CMS high school, with a larger point
estimate among girls, though coming from a low-quality school appears to be the driving
factor for this outcome.34
Overall, the pattern of impacts for mediating outcomes closely matches the main results in
Table 3. The Mediator Index in the final row tells a clear story of girls responding positively
to their new academic environment, suggesting that the gender differences we find in our
main results are reflected in gender differences in high school experiences.

VI. Explaining Gender Differences in Responsiveness to School Quality
Author Manuscript

We consider three broad explanations for gender differences in responsiveness to school
quality. First, the girls may differ from the boys in the lottery sample in terms of prior
academic preparation or other characteristics. However, we find no evidence of gender
differences in pre-treatment covariates such as income and prior test scores. Girls and boys
in the lottery sample have nearly identical 8th grade test scores, and we find no difference in
covariates by gender within choice lotteries. Moreover, girls and boys are balanced across
neighborhoods and choice schools, and an analysis of individual lotteries reveals that the
treatment effect for girls is greater in nearly every case. Thus we conclude that the pattern of
impacts by gender is not a function of other observed characteristics.35

Author Manuscript

Second, girls may respond to new environments and peer groups in ways that are more
conducive to academic achievement. Several recent studies in school settings have found
greater impacts for girls (e.g. Hastings, Kane and Staiger 2006, Kling, Liebman and Katz
2007, Anderson 2008, Angrist, Lang and Oreopoulos 2009, Angrist and Lavy 2009, Jackson
2010). Qualitative work on gender differences in the Chicago public schools and in the
Moving to Opportunity housing mobility experiment found important gender differences in
coping mechanisms and responses to the stress of a new environment, perhaps because of an
absence of same-sex role models in the home or in school, and greater conflict with the
norms of an academic or culturally dominant environment (Roderick 2003, ClampetLundquist et al. 2006).

Author Manuscript

A related possibility is that boys respond less productively to increased competition from
peers. Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) find that while males are more likely to seek out
tournament competition conditional on ability, they also overestimate their performance rank
within a group. Interestingly, Barankay (2011) finds that when employees are privately

34Because we have NSC data for students who do not graduate from CMS, we can explore the sensitivity of the high school
graduation results by coding non-graduates who attend college as graduates. When we code as graduates any student who ever
attended a 4 year college, the point estimate drops to 0.049 with a standard error of 0.034. However, some of these students drop out,
obtain a GED and attend a non-selective four-year college such as the University of Phoenix. When we restrict the change to students
who attend a very competitive (or more) college, the estimate increases slightly to 0.058 with a standard error of 0.033.
35If we regress four year college attendance in the full sample on all pre-treatment covariates except gender, the predicted values for
students in the lottery sample are 0.437 for girls and 0.419 for boys, and the difference is not significantly different from zero. Also,
Dee (2005) finds that girls perform better when they have female teachers, yet we find no evidence that lottery winners have higher
shares of female teachers.
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informed about their performance rank within a group, males respond more negatively to
declines in relative ranking. The results in Table 5 show that female lottery winners have
higher GPAs, while boys do not. However, GPAs are higher on average in higher quality
schools. We find that the GPA improvements for female lottery winners place them at the
same class rank as girls who lose the lottery (2nd row of Table 5, columns 2 and 3).
However, the insignificant results for boys’ GPA lead to a statistically significant decline of
about 6.5 percentile ranks within grade cohort. This evidence is consistent with boys
responding negatively (or less positively) to increased competition in a new school
environment. This pattern holds as well for the summary index of mediating outcomes –
female lottery winners and losers perform at about the median for their school, but lottery
winners attend schools where students have better grades and more difficult coursework. On
the other hand, male lottery winners typically rank lower in the distribution of grades and
course rigor when they attend their first choice school.

Author Manuscript
Author Manuscript

Third, girls may increase effort more than boys in response to a more academically
demanding environment. While boys and girls are equally likely to be “on track” in math at
the end of the first school year after choice, by the end of the second year only girls are still
more likely to be “on track” for a college-preparatory diploma (rows 4 and 5 of Table 5). In
row 6 of Table 5, we see that this is likely due to a statistically significant increase in the
probability that male lottery winners (especially in the “high quality” neighborhood school
sample) will fail an EOC math course at some point during high school. The lack of any
initial gender difference in the probability of being “on track” suggests that while boys and
girls are initially assigned to similar classes, boys are more likely to struggle. Several studies
have found that conditional on academic ability, girls spend more time on homework and
have better study habits (Jacob 2002, Hastings, Kane and Staiger 2006, Frenette and Zeman
2007). Girls might work harder in higher quality schools because they have higher expected
returns to a college education (Charles and Luoh 2003, Goldin, Katz and Kuziemko 2006,
DiPrete and Buchmann 2006). Increased effort could also be a response to gender
differences in peer group pressure (Akerlof and Kranton 2002, Clampet-Lunquist et al.
2006).

VII. Discussion and Conclusion

Author Manuscript

In this paper we study the impact of winning an admissions lottery to attend a public high
school in Charlotte-Mecklenburg on college enrollment and degree completion. We find
increases in postsecondary attainment that are concentrated among girls and students from
low quality neighborhood schools. We show that the benefits of choice are greater for lottery
applicants who experience larger gains in school quality, although we are unable to
separately disentangle mechanisms such as peer effects, resources and teachers that may be
at play.
This finding is important in light of the growing returns to post-secondary education and
increasing inequality of opportunity by race and income in the United States (Duncan and
Murnane 2011). Our findings imply that school choice can lead to long-run gains in
educational attainment, but only when applicants gain access to higher quality schools. Our
results also show that high school quality exerts an important influence on some students’
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life chances, suggesting that later life interventions may have a high social return on
investment, provided that we can uncover the correct mechanisms (e.g. Heckman, 2006).
Finally, we find that girls are more responsive than boys to gains in school quality. While
ultimately we can only speculate about the reasons, we note that the results are consistent
with growing evidence on the reverse gender gap in achievement when low-income children
are moved into a more academically competitive environment (Goldin, Katz and Kuziemko
2006, Hastings, Kane and Staiger 2006, Kling, Liebman and Katz 2007, Bailey and
Dynarski 2011). Uncovering the underlying reasons for gender differences in responsiveness
to an improved environment remains an important issue for explaining the growing female
advantage in completed schooling.
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Refer to Web version on PubMed Central for supplementary material.
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TABLE 1

Author Manuscript

SUMMARY STATISTICS

Median Household Income

Not Lottery

Lottery

Author Manuscript

$56,625

$46,465

Male

0.494

0.533

Black

0.410

0.614

Hispanic

0.035

0.044

Free/Reduced Price Lunch

0.424

0.633

8th Grade Reading Score (standardized)

0.036

−0.254

8th Grade Math Score (standardized)

−0.009

−0.278

Missing Reading and Math Scores

0.086

0.057

8th Grade Days Absent

9.020

10.890

8th Grade Days Out-of-School Suspended

1.350

2.150

Distance to Neighborhood School (miles)

4.320

4.540

Indicator if Admitted to First Choice

0.830

0.460

Sample Size

18,156

1,865

Notes: Sample consists of rising 9th to 11th grade students in the Fall of 2002 who were also enrolled in CMS in the previous school year. 8th
grade end-of-year (EOG) scores in math and reading are standardized at the state-year level. Median household income is calculated as the average
value within each student’s 2000 Census block group.
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TABLE 2

Author Manuscript

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY SCHOOL

Author Manuscript

8th Grade
Math
Score
(3)

% in lottery
sample with
this
neighborhood
school
(4)

% of
Freshmen
attend 4
year
college
(5)

College
“Value
Added”
(6)

0.286

0.441

0.050

0.590

0.047

32,744

0.939

−0.745

0.150

0.320

0.038

89,089

0.110

0.603

0.010

0.670

0.037

South Mecklenburg

67,177

0.203

0.331

0.070

0.540

0.018

East Mecklenburg

50,890

0.467

−0.044

0.130

0.470

0.014

Garinger

37,273

0.807

−0.662

0.170

0.290

0.003

Hopewell

67,998

0.288

0.001

0.040

0.530

−0.001

North Mecklenburg

66,861

0.256

0.255

0.030

0.540

−0.007

Independence

49,287

0.536

−0.106

0.080

0.430

−0.008

Butler

59,113

0.249

0.168

0.030

0.480

−0.009

Vance

52,514

0.630

−0.239

0.110

0.420

−0.039

Olympic

53,027

0.499

−0.180

0.130

0.370

−0.042

Waddell

43,901

0.660

−0.491

0.150

0.280

−0.056

West Mecklenburg

40,534

0.649

−0.504

0.160

0.240

−0.093

Northwest Arts

52,654

0.3 88

−0.166

n/a

0.490

0.032

Harding University

43,643

0.678

0.089

n/a

0.530

0.007

Berry Academy

41,568

0.790

−0.223

n/a

n/a

n/a

Med.
Household
Income
(1)

Fraction
Black
or
Latino
(2)

Myers Park

63,382

West Charlotte
Providence

Neighborhood School

Magnet Schools

Author Manuscript

Notes: The first fourteen schools are neighborhood schools, listed in order of the college “value-added” measure in Column 6. The last three
schools are magnet schools with no assigned neighborhood zone. Column 1 shows median household income in the census tract where students in
each school reside (based on the 2000 Census). 8th grade math scores in Column 3 are normalized at the state level. Column 4 shows the share of
students from each neighborhood zone that are in the lottery sample. Columns 5 and 6 are calculated based on student average characteristics in the
Fall 1998 and 1999 rising 9th grade cohorts, to minimize the influence of the lottery sample. College “value added” in Column 6 is estimated as the
school average residual from a student-level regression of an indicator for four year college enrollment on the set of covariates in equations (2) and
(3), including student demographics and prior math and reading scores. See text for details.
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TABLE 3

Author Manuscript

IMPACTS ON EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT
Gender

Neighborhood
School Quality

Low Quality
Neighborhood
Schools

All
(1)

Male
(2)

Female
(3)

High
(4)

Low
(5)

Male
(6)

Female
(7)

Any 4 Year College

0.0 18
[0.058]

−0.091
[0.056]

0.169*
[0.076]

−0.031
[0.065]

0.0 81
[0.077]

−0.038
[0.073]

0.220*
[0.110]

Selective 4 Year
College

0.042*
[0.019]

0.007
[0.024]

0.084
[0.045]

0.040
[0.026]

0.042
[0.032]

0.040
[0.049]

0.052
[0.040]

Any 4 Year College

0.047
[0.049]

−0.013
[0.043]

0.139*
[0.070]

−0.030
[0.057]

0.149**
[0.055]

0.1 06
[0.062]

0.226*
[0.095]

Selective 4 Year
College

0.040*
[0.017]

0.004
[0.014]

0.089*
[0.046]

0.026
[0.023]

0.057**
[0.026]

0.036
[0.025]

0.096*
[0.047]

Attainment Index

0.078*
[0.034]

−0.009
[0.043]

0.193**
[0.070]

−0.028
[0.044]

0.182**
[0.070]

0.1 00
[0.078]

0.28 8**
[0.111]

Sample Size

1,8 65

994

871

1,070

795

416

379

Ever Attended:

Earned a Degree from:

Author Manuscript

Notes: Each estimate reports the local average treatment effect (LATE) of attending a first choice school, using enrollment in Fall 2002 as the
endogenous variable in the first stage of the 2SLS system in equations (2) and (3). Standard errors are below each estimate in brackets and clustered
at the lottery (school-grade-priority group) level. In columns 2 through 7, indicators for winning the lottery are interacted with the subgroup
categories as instruments, and each set of subgroups (i.e. gender, gender and school quality) is mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive.
“Low quality” neighborhood schools are the 4 lowest ranked schools on the college “value-added” measure listed in Table 2 - all others are defined
as “high quality”. The attainment index in the last row is a summary measure of all the outcomes above plus enrollment and degree completion in
any college (including 2-year) and “most competitive” colleges, and is weighted to account for dependence across outcomes as described in the
text. Measures of college quality are calculated using the 2009 Barron’s Profile of American Colleges - see text for details.

*

Author Manuscript

- sig. 5% level.

**

- sig. 1% level.

Author Manuscript
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Author Manuscript
0.540**
[0.185]

Peer Index

0.118
[0.073]
−0.010
[0.036]
−0.140
[0.117]

% First Year Teachers

Teacher BA - Selective College

Resource / Teacher Index

Am Econ Rev. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2016 February 29.
994

871

0.018
[0.016]

0.585**
[0.220]

0.116**
[0.023]

−0.131
[0.132]

0.009
[0.038]

0.090
[0.076]

−0.440
[0.520]

0.095*
[0.049]

−0.098**
[0.030]

1,070

−0.015
[0.010]

0.220
[0.199]

0.063*
[0.019]

416

0.052**
[0.010]

0.053**
[0.009]
795

0.985**
[0.265]

0.176**
[0.016]

−0.004
[0.110]

0.083
[0.047]

0.092
[0.074]

−1.030*
[0.440]

0.991**
[0.206]

0.368**
[0.104]

−0.038
[0.082]

Male
(6)

0.93 5**
[0.257]

0.177**
[0.015]

0.006
[0.114]

0.078
[0.079]

0.151*
[0.076]

−0.257
[0.158]

−0.830**
[0.410]

0.982**
[0.205]

0.363**
[0.100]

−0.044
[0.082]

Low
(5)

−0.470
[0.770]

0.199
[0.189]

0.018
[0.085]

0.189*
[0.087]
0.601**
[0.185]

0.107
[0.077]

High
(4)

0.024
[0.067]

Female
(3)

379

0.059**
[0.011]

0.864**
[0.244]

0.178**
[0.016]

0.021
[0.108]

0.111*
[0.051]

0.060
[0.084]

−0.600
[0.450]

0.869**
[0.193]

0.357**
[0.098]

−0.050
[0.083]

Female
(7)

Low Quality
Neighborhood
Schools

Notes: Each estimate reports the local average treatment effect (LATE) of attending a first choice school, using enrollment in Fall 2002 as the endogenous variable in the first stage of the 2SLS system in
equations (2) and (3). Standard errors are below each estimate in brackets and clustered at the lottery (school-grade-priority group) level. In columns 2 through 7, indicators for winning the lottery are
interacted with the subgroup categories as instruments, and each set of subgroups (i.e. gender, gender and school quality) is mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. “Low quality” neighborhood
schools are the 4 lowest ranked schools on the college “value-added” measure listed in Table 2 - all others are defined as “high quality”. The classroom and teacher measures are calculated for students’
EOC math courses, which are required for graduation with a college-preparatory diploma. Measures of college quality are calculated using the 2009 Barron’s Profile of American Colleges - see text for

1,8 65

0.019
[0.016]

College “Value Added”

Sample Size

0.515*
[0.207]

0.545**
[0.202]

Residual “On Track” Index
0.020
[0.016]

0.114**
[0.014]

0.115**
[0.017]

−0.148
[0.111]

−0.025
[0.036]

0.140
[0.070]

% “On-Track” in Math

College preparatory factors:

−0.600
[0.500]

Class Size

−0.720
[0.500]

0.494*
[0.200]

0.168
[0.088]

Peer Math Score - School

School Characteristics:

0.151
[0.091]

0.042
[0.069]

0.056
[0.071]

Male
(2)

Percent Black / Hispanic

Peer Characteristics

All
(1)

Neighborhood School
Quality

Author Manuscript
Gender

Author Manuscript

IMPACTS ON SCHOOL CHARACTERISTICS

Author Manuscript

TABLE 4
Deming et al.
Page 25

Author Manuscript

Author Manuscript

Author Manuscript

Author Manuscript

- sig. 1% level.

- sig. 5% level.

**

*

details. Each index variable is a summary measure of all the relevant outcomes listed above it plus additional outcomes listed in the text and in Appendix Table A11, and they are weighted to account for
dependence across outcomes as described in the text.
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TABLE 5

Author Manuscript

IMPACTS ON MEDIATING OUTCOMES
Neighborhood
School Quality

Gender

Low Quality
Neighborhood
Schools

Author Manuscript
Author Manuscript

All
(1)

Male
(2)

Female
(3)

High
(4)

Low
(5)

Male
(6)

Female
(7)

High School GPA

0.127*
[0.058]

0.043
[0.079]

0.239**
[0.088]

0.077
[0.058]

0.189
[0.101]

0.119
[0.117]

0.271*
[0.107]

GPA rank within school cohort

−4.230
[2.520]

−6.440*
[3.160]

−1.930
[3.120]

−6.490*
[2.740]

−3.060
[3.990]

−4.510
[4.350]

−1.340
[4.360]

Num. EOC Math Courses

0.230**
[0.050]

0.084
[0.069]

0.424**
[0.087]

0.101
[0.069]

0.353**
[0.091]

0.200
[0.127]

0.534**
[0.106]

AP Calculus

−0.004
[0.025]

−0.008
[0.035]

0.001
[0.054]

−0.031
[0.029]

0.031
[0.047]

0.026
[0.039]

0.037
[0.080]

“On Track” in Math, 02-03

0.116**
[0.040]

0.110*
[0.053]

0.124**
[0.035]

0.071
[0.038]

0.161*
[0.063]

0.147*
[0.072]

0.175*
[0.068]

“On Track” in Math, 03-04

0.090*
[0.043]

0.038
[0.043]

0.158***
[0.053]

0.009
[0.055]

0.186**
[0.063]

0.091
[0.073]

0.256**
[0.071]

Ever failed an EOC Math Course

0.051
[0.031]

0.093*
[0.039]

−0.005
[0.034]

0.073
[0.046]

0.040
[0.040]

0.034
[0.066]

0.022
[0.053]

SAT Score

−3.570
[14.850]

4.7 80
[21.830]

−13.190
[18.170]

−26.750
[26.840]

5.4 80
[17.810]

5.1 80
[27.760]

3.8 90
[18.740]

Took the SAT

0.036
[0.028]

−0.070
[0.052]

0.177**
[0.060]

−0.048
[0.050]

0.124*
[0.063]

0.013
[0.080]

0.254**
[0.096]

Graduated from CMS

0.055
[0.032]

0.031
[0.039]

0.082
[0.065]

−0.022
[0.053]

0.138**
[0.055]

0.121
[0.077]

0.142
[0.075]

Mediator Index

0.056*
[0.021]

−0.004
[0.037]

0.135**
[0.047]

−0.006
[0.033]

0.121**
[0.037]

0.069
[0.048]

0.229**
[0.056]

Sample Size

1,8 65

994

871

1,070

795

416

379

Notes: The sample size listed is for the mediator summary index - sample sizes for individual outcomes vary. Each estimate reports the local
average treatment effect (LATE) of attending a first choice school, using enrollment in Fall 2002 as the endogenous variable in the first stage of the
2SLS system in equations (2) and (3). Standard errors are below each estimate in brackets and clustered at the lottery (school-grade-priority group)
level. In columns 2 through 7, indicators for winning the lottery are interacted with the subgroup categories as instruments, and each set of
subgroups (i.e. gender, gender and school quality) is mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. “Low quality” neighborhood schools are the 4
lowest ranked schools on the college “value-added” measure listed in Table 2 - all others are defined as “high quality”. EOC math are state
standardized courses in Algebra I, Geometry and Algebra II, and are required for graduation with a college-preparatory diploma. The mediator
index in the last row is a summary measure of all the outcomes above it plus the outcomes listed in Appendix Table A12, and is weighted to
account for dependence across outcomes as described in the text.

*

- sig. 5% level.

**

- sig. 1% level.
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